This article studies how the presence of an antitrust authority affects market-sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other's market. The set of these agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This article shows that while in the absence of the antitrust authority, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, when considering the antitrust authority, more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a pro-competitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once. JEL Classification Numbers: D43, K21, L41
Introduction
Reciprocal market-sharing agreements between …rms are agreements by which …rms divide up a market and agree not to enter each other's territory. These agreements are an anti-competitive practice; moreover, if after an investigation, the antitrust authority …nds proof of market-sharing agreements, the …rms involved are penalized.
The goal of the present article is to study how the presence of an antitrust authority a¤ects the market-sharing agreements made by …rms. We examine the network structure that arises when each …rm takes into account the cost, imposed by competition authorities, from signing these collusive agreements.
Antitrust authorities spend a substantial amount of time and e¤ort attempting to deter collusive market-sharing agreements. An example that stresses the importance of the problem studied and also helps us to understand the problem itself is the following. In October 2007, the Spanish Competition Authority (Comisión Nacional de la Competencia) …ned the savings banks BBK, Kutxa, Caja Vital and Caja Navarra over e24 million.
1 Between 1990 and , the cartel's members had agreed to carve up markets among them. In a minutes of one of the meetings held by the members of the cartel on February 1990, 2 it was noted that the top representatives of the "Basque Savings Banks and also Navarra Savings Bank have rea¢ rmed their commitment to maintain the territorial status quo ... thus avoiding competition among themselves and [they] agreed that the framework of the Federation remains the forum for information and sharing decisions on expansion and the way of opening new o¢ ces... ". 3 Accordingly, none of the savings banks in the cartel opened any branch in each other's "traditional" territory (while conducting a remarkable territorial expansion in other provinces, especially near the borders).
Consequently, this kind of agreements reduces competition in a market and thus these agreements damage to consumers.
In this article, market-sharing agreements are modeled as bilateral agreements, whereby …rms commit to staying out of each other's market. The set of these reciprocal agreements gives rise to a collusive network among …rms.
We choose a network framework because the structure of the relationship is important. Let us consider an antitrust authority de…ned by a probability of inspection and by a …ne that is imposed on …rms that are proved guilty of market-sharing agreements. Each part of the …gure depicts a di¤erent structure of relationships among savings banks. In part a, each …rm is connected to others as in a line. Furthermore, in part b, savings banks A, B and D are connected with savings bank C but are not linked to each other. In this case, they form a star.
In part a of the …gure, if the antitrust authority inspects savings bank C, the antitrust authority may only destroy the market-sharing agreements that C holds with savings banks B and D. In part b of the …gure, however, when the antitrust authority inspects C, it could destroy the entire network of relationships. In such a case, it is able to detect agreements that savings bank C holds with savings banks A, B and D.
Therefore, the antitrust authority is more successful in the second case than in the …rst case. If the antitrust authority knows what the structure of relationships among the …rms is, then it may concentrate its e¤orts in order to pick up the …rm in the central position, as by doing so it is able to destroy the entire network of relationships. Consequently, the structure of relationships is important, and both …rms and competition authorities should take into account this fact when de…ning their actions.
The present article answers the question of how the structure of collusive networks interacts with the antitrust policy that tries to deter such collusive practice and which are their implications on the competition.
We …rst study the actual probability of being discovered in a collusive network framework. We show that the probability of being caught depends on the agreements that each …rm has signed. That is, the probability of …rm i's being discovered depends not only on whether …rm i is inspected by the antitrust authority but also on whether any …rm that has formed an agreement with i is inspected. Therefore, if a …rm is inspected and a market-sharing agreement exists, then it is discovered, and the …rms involved are penalized. However, the …rm in consideration may be detected without being inspected because any …rm that has an agreement with this it is inspected.
We then provide a characterization of a stable network. While in the absence of the antitrust authority, a network is stable if its collusive alliances are large enough, when the antitrust authority is considered, structures that are more competitive can be sustained through bilateral agreements.
Furthermore, when the notion of strong stability is considered, the antitrust authority has a pro-competitive impact. That is, as the probability of inspection increases, …rms in large alliances have more incentives to renege on all their agreements at once, which might lead to a breakdown of collusion.
This article brings together elements from the literature of collusion (particularly, market-sharing agreements), networks, and law enforcement.
Networks is currently a very active …eld of research. Prominent contributions to this literature include, among others, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , Goyal (1993) , Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) , Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) and Goyal and Joshi (2006) . In particular, in the …rst, the formation and stability of social networks are modeled when agents choose to maintain or destroy links using the notion of pairwise stability. We follow Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2004) to characterize the stable and the strongly stable networks.
Asides from these theoretical articles, there is also more and more literature that applies the theory of economic networks to models of oligopoly. In particular, the present article is closely related to Belle ‡amme and Bloch (2004) . 4 They have analyzed the collusive network of market-sharing agreements among …rms, but they do not take into account the existence of antitrust authorities. Therefore, their results may be limited under those circumstances. They …nd that, in a stable network, there exists a lower bound in the size of collusive alliances. Moreover, when that threshold is equal to one, the set of isolated …rms is composed, at most, by only one …rm. These results are in contrast with the results of the present article. Under the presence of the antitrust authority, we are not able to de…ne that lower bound and, ultimately, this fact implies that more competitive structure are possible to sustain in a such case.
Another application of network economics is networks and crime. Two recent articles related to the present one are Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) and Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) . Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) study the impact of the network structure and its geometric details on individual and aggregate criminal behavior. Speci…cally, they provide a model of networks and crime, where the expected cost of committing criminal o¤enses is shaped by the network of criminal partners. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) further develop this approach. For their main results, they relate individual equilibrium outcomes to the players' positions in the network and also characterize an optimal network-based policy to disrupt the crime. In these articles, the network formation game is analyzed. This approach is di¤erent from ours. That is, we dispense with the speci…cs of the noncooperative game, and we model a notion of what is stable (a …xed-network approach). The other di¤erence is the kind of externalities that one link entails. In those articles, the competition among criminals for the booty acts as a negative externality. Additionally, they assume that the criminal connections transmit to players (criminals) the necessary skill to undertake successful criminal activities, that is, a positive externality. Speci…cally, higher the criminal connections, lead to a lower individual probability of being caught. These assumptions are in contrast with assumptions in the present article about the externalities of signing a new agreement. Namely, we assume that more agreements increase the "booty" as long as the individual pro…ts are a decreasing function in the number of active …rms in the market (positive externality). On the other hand, each link entails a negative externality. As the number of agreements increases, the probability of being discovered also increases.
Regarding the collusion literature, after the seminal contribution of Stigler (1950) , collusive cartels have been extensively studied. For an excellent reference of this literature, see Vives (2001) .
As the present article, there are a number of articles that study the e¤ect of antitrust policy on cartel behavior. Among others, we can mention Block et al. (1981) as the …rst systematic attempt to estimate the impact of antitrust enforcement on horizontal minimum price …xing. Their model explicitly considers the e¤ect of antitrust enforcement on the decision of …rms within an industry to …x prices collusively. They show that a cartel's optimal price is an intermediate price (between the competitive price and the cartel's price in absence of antitrust authority) and that this intermediate price depends on the levels of antitrust enforcement e¤orts and penalties. However, the interest for studying the e¤ect of the antitrust policy on the collusive behavior has reemerged. Harrington (2004) and Harrington (2005) explore how detection a¤ects cartel pricing when detection and penalties are endogenous. Firms want to raise prices but not suspicions that they are coordinating their behavior. In Harrington (2005) , by assuming that the probability of detection is sensitive to price changes, he shows that the steady-state price is decreasing in the damage and in the probability of detection. These results are in line with results in the present article. 5 Additionally, for example, Besanko and Spulber (1989 and with a di¤erent approach, use a game of incomplete information where the …rms'common cost is private information and neither the antitrust authority nor the buyers observe the cartel formation. They …nd that the cartel's equilibrium price is decreasing in the …nes. LaCasse, 1995 and Polo, 1997 follow this approach.
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Universidad ORT Uruguay He …nds, however, a long-run result of neutrality with respect to …xed penalties. The main di¤erence between the present article and the previous articles is that we study the impact of the antitrust policy on the structure of collusive agreements.
The outline of this article is as follows. Section 2 presents the model of marketsharing agreements and provides general de…nitions concerning networks. Section 3 characterizes the stable and strongly stable collusive networks in a symmetric context. Likewise, this section studies the set of pairwise stable and strongly stable networks under di¤erent levels of antitrust enforcement, and it analyzes the impact of the antitrust authority over competition. The article concludes in Section 4. All proofs are relegated to an appendix that it is avaiable to readers upon request.
The Model Firms
The model consists of N risk-neutral and symmetric …rms indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; N . Each …rm is associated to a market, that is, its home market. Markets are assumed symmetric. We are considering that each …rm has incentives to enter into all foreign markets. Nevertheless, …rm i does not enter into foreign market j, and vice versa, if a reciprocal market-sharing agreement exists between them.
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Let g ij 2 f0; 1g denote the existence of an agreement between …rms i and j. Thus, g ij = 1 means that …rm i has signed an agreement with …rm j and vice versa.
Let n i be the number of active …rms in market i and m i be the number of agreements formed by …rm i. That is, n i = N m i . Let i j ( ) be the pro…ts of …rm i on market j. Firm i has two sources of pro…ts. Firm i collects pro…ts on its home market, i i (n i ), and on all foreign market where there does not exist an agreement, X j;g ij =0 i j (n j ). The symmetric …rm and symmetric market assumptions allow us to write i j ( ) = ( ). Therefore, the total pro…ts of …rm i can be written as follows:
This article appeals to some properties for pro…t functions used by Belle ‡amme and Bloch (2004), henceforth BB. We assume that: (i) individual pro…ts are decreasing in the number of active …rms in the market, (n i 1) (n i ) 0; and (ii) individual pro…ts are log-convex in the number of active …rms in the market,
. 6 It is assumed that these agreements are enforceable.
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The Antitrust Authority
We de…ne an antitrust authority (AA) as a pair f ; F ( )g, where 2 [0; 1) is the constant probability that a market-sharing suit is initiated, and F ( ) 0 represents the monetary penalty that a …rm must pay if it is convicted of market-sharing agreements. We assume that the AA sets the penalty equal to …rms'limited liability. That is, F ( ) = .
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The technology is such that when the AA inspects, if there is a market-sharing agreement, then the AA detects it. Additionally, the AA also identi…es the two …rms involved in the agreement. That is, if a …rm is inspected by the AA, it is assumed that the AA is able to detect, without error, whether a market-sharing agreement has occurred. Likewise, if it has occurred, the AA can detect the …rms that signed that agreement. In such a case, both …rms are penalized, and each must pay F ( ) = i . In the economic literature of optimal enforcement, …nes are usually assumed as socially costless. Therefore, when the AA seeks to deter collusion, the …nes should be set at the maximal level in order to minimize the inspection cost. 8 An implication of this is that the …nes need not to be related to the illegal pro…ts or to the harm that the o¤enders caused. They only need to be as high as it is possible in order to deter collusion. This implication holds as long as there are not legal errors in the detection process (false convictions), or as long as the …nes do not imply bankruptcy to convicted …rms. Since, in the article, we assume that the competition authority does not commit legal errors and the framework is a static one, that is, we do not care about bankruptcy, then it is consistent to set the …ne equals to …rms'limited liability, which is, in our model, equal to the total …rm's pro…ts.
9
Regarding the inspection process, I assume that antitrust authorities have constant and exogenous budgets that allow them to inspect a …xed number of …rms, that is, 2 [0; 1) is a constant and exogenous probability of inspection. It can be also interpreted as a surprise inspection policy, that although it may be e¤ective, 10 it is not an usual practice. Moreover, since agreements are bilateral, in any particular inquiry, the AA is able to know only the inmmediate partners that a …rm has in each agreement, that 7 See Roldán, 2008 for a detailed discussion. 8 This holds when …rms are risk-neutral. 9 Although this theoretical formulation could be in contrast with current practice, the …ne de…ned here could be in line with antitrust regulation if we associate this form of penalty as a ceiling on the …ne that can be imposed on a …rm guilty.
10 Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud (2007) argue that "surprise inspections are by far the most e¤ective and sometimes the only means of obtaining the necessary evidence...."
is, we only consider that the AA discovers immediate links.
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In this network framework, however, the actual probability of being caught is higher than the probability of being inspected. That is, given the technology of inspection assumed, when a …rm i forms a new market-sharing agreement, it will increase its probability of being detected. That is, the probability of …rm i being caught by the AA depends not only on whether …rm i is inspected but on whether any other …rm with which …rm i has a link, is also inspected. Therefore, …rm i will not be detected if i is not inspected and if j, that has an agreement with i, is not inspected.
12 That is, Pr (Detected i) = 1 Pr (No Detected i), 13 where
Therefore, the probability of being detected depends on how many agreements …rm i has signed, that is, m i = N n i . Note that, as the number of agreements m i = N n i increases, Pr (Detected i) also increases. On the other hand, as m i = N n i goes to zero, Pr (Detected i) ! .
From the AA's point of view, the structure of relationships described by m i = N n i generates scale economies on detection as
Incentives to form an agreement
An essential part of the model is the …rm's incentive to form an agreement. Assume that …rm i has formed m i = N n i agreements, but has not yet formed an agreement with a …rm j, that is, g ij = 0. Then, by using expressions (1) and (2), we compute …rm i's expected pro…ts as:
11 A more realistic assumption would be one in which the AA could opened an additional inquiry over those partners in order to know whether they have other collusive links. In such a case, the probability of being detected will increase a little bit more which, in turn, will decrease even more the incentive to form agreements. Accordingly, under such circumstances, the results would not change qualitatively.
12 It is assumed that events "No inspected i" and "No inspected j" are independent each other.
14 Recall that i = F ( ).
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Now, if …rm i decides to form a link with …rm j, its expected pro…ts will be
By subtracting (3) from (4), we obtain …rm i's incentive to form an agreement with …rm j as:
Let J i j (n i ; n j ; n k ; ) denote the bracket expression in (5) and let us rewrite it as
It is worth noting that when = 0 …rm i's incentive to form a market-sharing agreement with …rm j only depends on the characteristics of markets i and j. In terms of Goyal and Joshi (2006) , this problem satisfy the local spillovers property. Namely, the marginal returns to …rm i from a market sharing agreement with …rm j depend only on the number agreements of i and j. When an antitrust authority exists, however, i j will also depend on the characteristics of all markets k in which …rm i is active. 15 We are interested in the sign of i j because it is what is relevant for deciding whether or not one more link is formed. That is, if i j 0, …rm i has an incentive to form an agreement with j. Consequently, when 6 = 1, i j 0 only if J i j (n i ; n j ; n k ; ) 0. Hence, in the following, we will focus only on J i j (n i ; n j ; n k ; ). Forming one more link has several con ‡icting consequences. From …rm i's point of view, note that when a link is formed between …rms i and j, …rm j agrees not to enter market i. Therefore, the number of active …rms in market i will decrease, and it increases its pro…ts by (n i 1) (n i ). Given the reciprocal nature of this agreement, …rm i does not enter market j, either. Then, …rm i loses access to foreign market j, and decreases its pro…ts by (n j ). Additionally, if …rm j is inspected, and it is inspected with probability , …rm i will lose (n i 1) + X k6 =j;g ki =0
(n k ).
15 We just consider the case when m i = N n i 6 = 0. However, when …rm i is isolated, that is, m i = N n i = 0, the …rm i's incentive to form an agreement is slightly di¤erent from (5). That is,
The following lemma summarizes the relationship between the incentives to form an additional agreements and the number of active …rms in each market.
Lemma 1 As ( ) is a decreasing function on its argument, then J i j (n i ; n j ; n k ; ) is increasing in n j and n k , ambiguous regarding to n i , and it is decreasing in .
To sum up, given the antitrust policy f ; F ( )g, …rms compute the incentives to form agreements and then decide whether or not to form an agreement. Firms form them if they yield positive pro…ts after expected penalties from signing marketsharing agreements. If an inquiry is opened, and if a …rm is convicted of forming a market-sharing agreement, it must pay F ( ) = i .
Background de…nitions
We are considering …rms that enter into bilateral relationships with each other and the set of these bilateral relationships gives rise to a collusive network g. In this part, we introduce some notations and terminology from graph theory that will be useful in describing and analyzing the model. Networks. Let N = f1; 2; :::; N g, N 3 denote a …nite set of identical …rms.
o is a description of the pairwise relationship between …rms. Let g + g ij denote the network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g and denote by g g ij the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network g.
Some networks that play a prominent role in our analysis are the complete network and the empty network. The complete network, g c , is a network in which g ij = 1; 8i; j 2 N . In contrast, the empty network, g e , is a network in which g ij = 0; 8i; j 2 N; i 6 = j. Formally, a …rm i is isolated if g ij = 0; 8j 6 = i and 8 j 2 N . Components. A component g 0 of a network g is a maximally connected subset of g: Note that from this de…nition, an isolated …rm is not considered a component.
Let
it is the number of …rms belonging to g 0 .
Stable collusive networks. Our interest is to study which networks are likely to arise. As a result, we need to de…ne a notion of stability. In the present article, we always use a notion of pairwise stability.
Pairwise stable networks. The following approach is taken by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . In terms of our model, a network g is said to be pairwise stable if and only if:
(i) 8i; j s:t: g ij = 1, J i j (n i + 1; n j + 1; n k ; ) 0 J j i (n j + 1; n i + 1; n k ; ) 0
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The above stability notion is a relatively weak criterion in the sense that it provides broad predictions and the …rm's deviations are constrained. 16 Nevertheless, that criterion provides a test to eliminate the unstable networks and it should be seen as a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for a network to be stable.
Strongly pairwise stable networks. In order to obtain a stronger concept of stability, we allow deviations by coalitions of …rms. We allow …rms to delete some or all marketsharing agreements that they have already formed.
We say that a network is pairwise strongly stable if it is immune to deviations by coalitions of two …rms. 17 Moreover, it is possible to prove that any strongly pairwise stable network is pairwise stable. The strong stability notion can thus be thought of as su¢ cient condition for stability.
3 The stability characterization and the set of stable networks
In this section, we will characterize pairwise stable and strongly pairwise stable networks under the presence of an AA in a symmetric context.
Pairwise stable collusive network
Consider the following network g that can be decomposed into distinct complete components, g 1 ,...,g L , of di¤erent sizes, that is, m (g l ) 6 = m (g l 0 ), 8l; l 0 . Let us de…ne m (g h ) := min fm (g 1 ) ; :::; m (g L )g. That is, g h is the smallest component of a network g, whose size is m (g h ) + 1.
The follow Proposition provides the characterization of the pairwise stable networks in a symmetric context when an AA exists. Note that this Proposition holds for all m (g h ) 1.
Proposition 1 A network g is pairwise stable if and only if it can be decomposed into a set of isolated …rms and distinct complete components, g 1 ,...,g L of di¤erent sizes m (g l ) 6 = m (g l 0 ), 8l; l 0 such that no isolated …rm has an incentive to form a link with another isolated one and no …rm i that belongs to the smallest component has an incentive to cut a link with a …rm inside it.
It is important to note that the AA imposes a change in the minimal size of the components, and that it does not restrict the set of isolated …rms. From the de…nition of J i j , g ij = 1 only if:
(1 ) (n 1) 2 (n) + X k6 =h;ghk=0
(n k ) ; 8h = i; j
In the absence of the AA, that is, = 0, the above inequality becomes (n 1) > 2 (n). Therefore, by log-convexity, it is possible to guarantee the existence of a number n = N m such that (n 1) 2 (n ). m = N n is thus interpreted as the minimal number of agreements that a …rm already has to have in order to form an additional one. In the absence of a competition authority, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough.
In contrast, under the presence of the AA, that is, 6 = 0, we are not able to reach a unique lower bound. From (6) we can see that the minimal number of agreements, m (g h ), that assures that the condition holds depends on and on g.
In spite of the fact that m (g h ) depends on particular conditions, it is easy to see that m (g h ) m . 18 Nevertheless, we will show below that this is not necessarily a perverse e¤ect of the AA because m (g h ) 1 does not put any restriction on the set of isolated …rm.
Pairwise strongly stable collusive network
We re…ne the set of stable networks by using the strong stability condition. Now we allow …rms to delete a subset of links already formed and we will study when a …rm has no incentive to renege on its agreements. This point is very important in our context because a network composed by large alliances will be di¢ cult to sustain.
Proposition 2 A network g is pairwise strongly stable if and only if it is pairwise stable and no …rm prefers to cut all its agreements at once, that is,
18 By rewriting (6), we obtain:
2; for h = i; j such that g ij = 1
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It is worth remarking that a strongly stable network may fail to exist. Nonetheless, one important advantage of the strong criterion is to provide a more accurate prediction of which network structures will prevail.
In the Appendix of the paper 20 we present two examples that illustrate the above propositions and contrast the results of the two cases, namely, under the absence of the AA ( = 0) and under the presence of the AA ( 6 = 0).
The set of stable collusive networks
Given the network characterization of the previous section, we now analyze which kinds of stable networks can be sustained at di¤erent levels of the antitrust enforcement.
In our setting, the presence of the antitrust authority imposes a cost to each formed link, and as a result, the expected gain of being a part of a collusive agreement may not be positive. That is, the expected sanction imposed by the AA a¤ects the incentive participation constraint of each potential alliance's member and in turn changes the set of possible network structures that can arise.
The set of pairwise stable networks
First of all, a complete network is always pairwise stable for su¢ ciently low values of . Let us de…ne c := 1
.
Proposition 3
The complete network g c is pairwise stable if and only if c .
Being a part of a collusive agreement entails positive bene…ts. To serve a link increases the pro…ts of …rms that participate in it, that is, (n) is decreasing in n. Therefore, the complete network will be pairwise stable as long as its costs, that is, the expected sanction, is su¢ ciently low.
Second, the empty network arises as pairwise stable for an su¢ ciently high. Let us de…ne e (N ) := 1
2 , for 8N 2 [3; 1) and e (N ) < 1.
Proposition 4 For 8N 2 [3; 1), the empty network g e is pairwise stable if and only if > e (N ).
19 To see this, assume that a …rm reneges on one of its agreements. Then, it gains access to a market whose pro…ts are at least equal to the pro…t it makes on its home market after cutting a link. Therefore, if a …rm has an incentive to cut one agreement, the most pro…table deviation for it is to renege on all its agreements at once. 20 It is available to the readers on request.
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Moreover, observe that e (N ) is strictly decreasing in N . That is, as N increases, the "loot" becomes less "attractive" (that is, (N ) is decreasing in N ) , and the threshold will decrease as a result.
By straightforward computations, we can see that e (N ) < c . Consequently, from the above Propositions, we claim the following: (N ) ; c ], g e and g c belong to the set of pairwise stable networks.
From Proposition 3 and 4, we can state that pairwise stable networks always exist. That is, …rst, for c , the complete network belongs to the set of stable networks. Second, for > e (N ), the empty network will be stable. And given that e (N ) < c , for 2 ( e (N ) ; c ], g e and g c arise as pairwise stable con…gurations.
When 6 = 0, there exists a positive probability of being caught in a market-sharing agreement. Consequently, there exists a positive probability of losing pro…ts not only in the market where the agreement is signed but also in markets in which the …rm is active, that is in markets where the …rm does not collude.
For …rms in smaller alliances, the cost of forming a link becomes more signi…cant relative to the bene…ts of doing so. That is, a …rm i inside a small alliance does not have much to gain and has a lot to lose when one more link is made. More precisely, by signing an agreement, it gains (1 ) (n i 1) (n i ), which decreases as the alliance becomes smaller; 21 and it not only loses the access to pro…ts in the foreign market j, (n j ) but also loses, in expected terms, P k:g ik =0
Therefore, …rms in smaller components are more sensitive to the antitrust enforcement.
The intuition provided above is summarized in the next Proposition. Before introducing it, let us de…ne
That is, at (n i ) a …rm i, with n i competitors in its home market, is indi¤erent to forming a link, that is, J i j = 0. Therefore, when > (n i ), then J i j < 0, and …rms i and j do not sign a collusive agreement. 21 Remember that the number of active …rms in a market, that is n i , is greater in smaller components.
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From the Proposition it follows that the threshold is smaller for …rms in smaller alliances (with larger number of competitors in their home markets). Then, as becomes greater, the AA …rst tears down small alliances. In other words, the smaller components are more sensitive to the antitrust policy. In the limit, …rms must decide to form a very large alliance (complete network) or no alliance at all (empty network).
Proposition 6 For = c > 0, the only pairwise stable networks are g e and g c .
Then, by setting > c , the AA completely deters the formation of collusive agreements.
The set of pairwise strongly stable networks Now, we turn our attention to the notion of strongly stable networks and we answer which kinds of networks arise as the AA changes its enforcement level. From the previous section, we know that there will be some pairwise stable networks that will not be stable against changes in the agreements made by …rms. By applying (7), we assert the following:
Proposition 7 As increases, …rms in large components have more incentives to delete all links at once.
That is, as increases, the condition of strong stability is harder to sustain in larger components. In other words, faced with an increasing , a …rm has to consider whether to maintain or to destroy its agreements. Therefore, the …rm balances the pros and the cons of any decision. Namely, if a …rm maintains its agreements, its bene…ts are (1 )
Let us note that these bene…ts decrease as the probability of inspection, , increases, and the fall in the expected bene…ts is higher as m = N n increases.
Instead, if the …rm decides to destroy all its agreements, it is not only not penalized now by the AA, but it will also gain access to markets where it was colluding before. In such a situation, it will make pro…ts on all these new foreign markets; that is, (N n) (n + 1). Let us observe that these markets are more pro…table as the number of competitors on them is smaller, that is, as m = N n is larger.
Therefore, …rms belonging to larger alliances, that is, smaller n i , have more incentives to cut all their agreements at once as the AA increases the cost of forming links.
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Universidad ORT Uruguay Now let us consider the empty network under the strongly stable notion. It is worth noting that if g e is pairwise stable, it is also strongly pairwise stable, as the condition (7) is always satis…ed for …rms that remaining alone. That is, in an empty network, …rms do not have any link, so the condition of not having incentives to renege on all agreements at once is redundant for any i 2 g e . Therefore, we claim that Claim 2 8 > e (N ) the empty network is always strongly pairwise stable.
Accordingly, if for some > e (N ) all alliances have been torn down by the AA, the only network con…guration that exists is the empty one.
Examples
The following examples illustrate the changes that the AA imposes in the set of pairwise stable networks.
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Example 1 Pairwise stable (ps) networks. Cournot competition with exponential inverse demand function P (Q) = e Q When the inverse demand function is P (Q) = e Q , we can compute the equilibrium pro…ts as (n) = e n . Assume that N = 5. The following table depicts the set of pairwise stable networks for di¤erent values of the antitrust policy. Table 1 Set of ps networks 2 [0; 0:015) f3; 2g ; f4; 1g ; f5g 2 [0:015; 0:04) f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g 2 [0:04; 0:065) f2; 1; 1; 1g ; f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g 2 [0:065; 0:21) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g 2 [0:21; 0:25) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g 2 [0:25; 0:26) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f5g > 0:26 f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g
First of all, it is useful to clarify some notations there. In the table, the complete network is represented by f5g, and, for example, f3; 1; 1g denotes a network decomposed into two isolated …rms and one complete component of size three.
When is su¢ ciently low (that is, < 0:015) the presence of the AA does not change the set of pairwise stable networks. However, when the antitrust enforcement 22 See Roldán, 2008 for all calculation details.
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Universidad ORT Uruguay is su¢ ciently high (that is, > 0:26) the only pairwise stable network is the empty one. Accordingly, all …rms are active in all markets.
Consider now values of between these two extreme cases. Although di¤erent con…gurations arise, the main features to be highlighted are the following two. First, when increases, structures that are more competitive can be sustained through bilateral agreements. In particular, when becomes greater, the smaller components are more sensitive to the antitrust policy. For example, when 2 [0:015; 0:04), the network structure f3; 2g is not stable because …rms in smaller components have incentives to cut their agreements and the network f3; 1; 1g becomes stable. 23 Second, as increases the set of stable network con…gurations becomes more polarized. That is, in our analytical example, when 2 (0:25; 0:26), the empty or complete networks are the only possible stable network con…gurations. This can be understood because the AA imposes the costs of forming links, and reduces the pro…tability of each one. As a result, …rms decide either to form more and more links, that is, to reduce the number of competitors in their home markets, in order to balance their bene…ts with their cost; or to form no link at all and thus avoid the costs levied by the AA.
The next example illustrates the impact of the AA on the set of strongly stable networks and two special features of the strong criterion.
Example 2 Pairwise strongly stable (pss) networks. Cournot competition for exponential inverse demand function: P (Q) = e Q As in the last example, assume that N = 5. Given that a pairwise strongly stable network is always pairwise stable, it su¢ ces to check the condition (7) for all network structures in Table 2 at di¤erent levels of the antitrust policy. Table 2 Set of ps networks Set of pss networks 2 [0; 0:015) f3; 2g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f3; 2g 2 [0:015; 0:04) f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g it fails to exist 2 [0:04; 0:065) f2; 1; 1; 1g ; f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f2; 1; 1; 1g 2 [0:065; 0:21) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g 2 [0:21; 0:25) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g 2 [0:25; 0:26) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f5g f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g > 0:26 f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g
First of all, the example clari…es that the possible set of stable networks is reduced by using the strongly stable criterion. However, the strongly stable network might fail to exist and every network is defeated by some other network, which only leads to a cycling of these events. This is what happens for 2 [0:015; 0:04).
Second, the incentive to free ride and delete all links is higher in larger alliances. That is, when a …rm that belongs to a large alliance cuts all its agreements at once, it will recover access to more pro…table markets than a …rm belonging to a smaller component. In the example, the complete network f5g and the stable network f4; 1g do not pass the strongly stable condition. By extending this argument, the empty network is the only strongly stable network for > 0:065.
Therefore, the antitrust policy is on the side of the competition as long as it gives …rms in large alliances more incentives to renege on their agreements at once.
The AA and its e¤ects on competition
From the previous analysis, we conclude that as increases, the smaller alliances are …rst in being destroyed by the antitrust policy. In turn, the set of isolated …rms expands.
Moreover, as becomes larger, m (g h ) also increases. From Proposition 7, however, we know that large alliances are harder to sustain.
Therefore, as increases, the empty network, g e , tends to emerge as the only pairwise strongly stable network. Let us recall that in an empty network, all …rms are active in all markets. We then infer that the antitrust policy is a pro-competitive one.
As it is well known, in Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous goods, the social surplus (V ) is increasing in the number of active …rms on the market. Accordingly, for a given , the network con…guration that maximizes V is one that involves more …rms present on foreign markets, that is a network where …rms have fewer connections among them. From the Example 2, for = 0:05, the pairwise stable network f2; 1; 1; 1g maximizes welfare.
From Proposition 6, as increases, in particular, when > c , the g e is the only network that prevails over time. Therefore, in such a case, V would be the maximum.
Although > c may be the "advice" to give to the AA, it may not be the optimal antitrust policy, as the necessary costs to attain that enforcement level may outweigh its positive impact on the social surplus. That is, in order to know whether the AA has a net positive e¤ect on social welfare, we must also consider the enforcement cost.
Therefore, the net social welfare, W , depends on the network structure g (which depends, at last, on the particular level of ) as well as on the cost of initiating a market-sharing agreement suit against a …rm, C ( ).
Therefore, if the AA were concerned about the optimal antitrust policy, then it would have to choose such that it maximizes
Universidad ORT Uruguay Unfortunately, the optimal antitrust policy is di¢ cult to evaluate in our context because of the multiplicity in network con…gurations for each level of antitrust enforcement. In our network context, g ( ) is not unique for each . Moreover, a particular network g can emerge as being pairwise stable for di¤erent levels of .
Concluding Remarks
We have characterized the stable collusive network that arises when …rms form marketsharing agreements among themselves in a symmetric oligopolistic setting when an antitrust authority exists.
In this network framework, the incentives to participate in a collusive agreement are weakened by the AA because it reduces the net expected bene…t from signing them. Under the presence of the AA, the expected penalties of forming illegal links appear, and they are positively related with the network con…guration. This is because of two facts. First, …rms, when considering whether to sign an agreement, take into account the probability of being discovered rather than the probability of being inspected and the …rst probability positively depends on the number of agreements each …rm has signed. Second, the …ne imposed by the AA on a guilty …rm is equal to its total pro…ts, which depend on the number of active …rms in its home market and also on the number of active …rms in all foreign markets in which the guilty …rm does not collude. Consequently, the penalty will be greater as the number of active …rms in these markets is smaller, that is, as the number of links is larger.
We have shown that, the pairwise stable network can be decomposed into a set of isolated …rms and complete components of di¤erent sizes. When the AA exists, however, we cannot de…ne a unique lower bound on the size of complete components because it now depends on each network con…guration and on probability of each of being inspected. In turn, this implies that, although the lower bound on the size of complete components may be greater, the set of isolated …rms enlarges and, …nally, structures that are more competitive can be sustained through bilateral agreements.
We have also shown that antitrust laws have a pro-competitive e¤ect as they give …rms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once. Therefore, the empty network might arise as the only strongly stable network.
Although the optimal deterrence policy is beyond of the scope of the current article, an important policy implication of the present formulation is that the organization of the illegal behavior matters. That is, the analysis of the optimal deterrence of marketsharing agreements has to take into account the organizational structure of collusive …rms. Furthermore, without considering the e¤ects of the organizational structure, empirical studies may overestimate the contribution of e¤orts devoted to investigate and prosecute collusive agreements.
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In this article, we consider a relatively simple setting for analyzing the e¤ect of the antitrust policy on the structure of criminal behavior. One can then diversify from here in many directions. One of them is to consider that the probability of inspection is sensitive to the network structure. This introduces some asymmetry among …rms, which may then change the criminal network's con…guration. Another extension to this article is to introduce a more complex but realistic context. A particular extension is how the internal structure of these conspiracies may a¤ect their observable behavior, which, in turn, may throw some light on the optimal antitrust policy. cirossi and Spagnolo, 2005; Connor, 2006; Zimmerman and Connor, 2005. 
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Universidad ORT Uruguay rewrite J i j as follows:
The same applies for J j i , J j l and J l j . Given that g il = 0, then one or both conditions hold for h = i and/or h = l :
By log-convexity, we can establish that
A D
From stability:
However, given that pro…ts are decreasing functions, and given that the number of terms in P k:g ik =0 i (n k ) in B and E are di¤erent, we can say that
B > E
This is a contradiction. Therefore g 0 must be a complete component.
Third: if g is stable, then the complete components must have di¤erent sizes. Take two …rms i; j in component g 0 and a …rm l in g 00 . Suppose, by contradiction, that m(g 0 ) + 1 = m(g 00 ) + 1. Therefore, we have n i = n j = n l n. The stability of g implies that J 
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For h = i and/or h = l, the following condition holds:
A D
From the stability conditions
B > E
Nevertheless, it is a contradiction with the assumption that pro…ts are log-convex and with the stability of g.
Finally, if i 2 g h does not have incentives to cut a link with a …rm inside its component, it is true that
Assume by contradiction that j 2 g l for m (g l ) > m (g h ) has an incentive to cut a link with a …rm inside its component. Then,
when pro…ts are decreasing in n, then RHS(8)>RHS(9). By the log-convexity assumption LHS(8)<LHS(9). Therefore, if i does not have an incentive to cut a link with a …rm inside its component, LHS(8)> RHS(8), then LHS(9)>RHS(9), which contradicts (9).
Let us consider the su¢ ciency part. Consider a network g that can be decomposed 25 Universidad ORT Uruguay into a set of isolated …rms and distinct complete components, g 1 ,...,g L of di¤erent sizes m (g l ) 6 = m (g l 0 ),8l; l 0 . Isolated players have no incentive to create a link with another isolated one. As long as a …rm i, which belongs to the smallest component, does not have incentives to cut a link with a …rm inside its component, then, by Lemma 3, no …rm inside a component has incentives to cut a link. Additionally, given that m (g l ) 6 = m (g l 0 ),8l; l 0 , there do not exist two …rms belonging to di¤erent components that have an incentive to form an agreement between themselves.
Proof Proposition 2 ) Consider a pairwise strong Nash equilibrium s . Given that any strongly pairwise stable network is pairwise stable, g (s ) can be decomposed into a set of isolated …rms and complete components where no isolated …rm wants to form a link with another isolated one and (8) holds. However, assume, by contradiction, that some component g l does not satisfy the condition (1
Then, s is not a Nash equilibrium, as any …rm i in g l has a pro…table deviation by choosing s 0 i = ;. (= Assume that network g can be decomposed into a set of isolated …rms and complete components of di¤erent sizes, where inequality (8) holds. Also assume that
We will show that the following strategies form a pairwise strong Nash equilibrium. For …rm i 2 g l , it announces s i = fjjj 2 g l ; j 6 = ig; however, if i is isolated, it announces s i = ;. Hence, a) No isolated …rm i has an incentive to create a link with another …rm j,
, the …rm has no incentive to destroy all of its m links. We must consider, however, the …rm's incentives to cut a subset of them. Let us assume that it has an incentive to delete a strict subset of its links; hence, it chooses to delete h links because
Because we are considering a strict subset of links, then h < m 1 and h + 1 < m 1, and, as a result,
This contradicts our hypothesis. c) No …rm i 2 g l has an incentive to create a link with …rm j 2 g l 0 as i = 2 s j . Moreover, as m (g l ) 6 = m (g l 0 ) for all l 6 = l 0 , no pair of …rms i 2 g l and j 2 g l 0 has an incentive to create a new link between them. 
Given that LHS(10)>LHS (7) and by straightforward computations, we can show that RHS(7)>RHS(10), when condition(7) holds then LHS(10)>RHS(10), which contradicts (10).
Proof Proposition 3 (=)) If g c is pairwise stable, then
(1 ) (1) 2 (2)
By rewriting the last condition, we get c = 1
((=) If c = 1
, then (1 ) (1) 2 (2). Therefore, g c will be pairwise stable.
Proof Proposition 4 Assume that N 3. (=)) If g e is pairwise stable then, 
Universidad ORT Uruguay
Proof Proposition 7 The partial derivative of (7) respect to is (m + 1)
That is, as increases, the incentive to maintain links decreases. Now, we must check whether (15) is larger for …rms in large components. Without a loss of generality, assume that there are two components whose sizes are m 1 + 1 and m 2 + 1 respectively, such that m 1 > m 2 . After some computations, we can verify that, for a su¢ ciently high m, the following holds: Let us recall that in this context (n) = e n . In the absence of the AA, that is, = 0, the pairwise stability condition (6) becomes (n 1) (n) = e 2; 8n
Therefore, any two …rms have incentives to form a link. Therefore, m = 1 and any network with complete components of di¤erent sizes with at most one isolated …rm is pairwise stable. In contrast, when AA exists, that is, 6 = 0 that is no longer true. Assume, for example, N = 7 and = 0:025. In such a context, the following is one network con…guration that belongs to the set of the pairwise stable networks: Let us observe that in this case, m (g h ) = 1, and the number of isolated …rms in that stable network is greater than one. This result is in a sharp contrast to the prediction established in the absence of the AA.
We can easily check the su¢ cient conditions for pairwise stability: (i) for any isolated …rm, it is true that (6) (1 ) < 2 (7) + (3 (5) + 2 (6)). And (ii) no …rm in the smallest component wants to cut a link that it serves because it is pro…table to maintain it. That is, (6) holds.
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Example 4 Pairwise Stable Network and Strongly Stable Network for = 0 and 6 = 0. Cournot competition with exponential inverse demand function P (Q) = e Q As stated above, in this competitive context, (n) = e n . Assume now that N = 5. The following table depicts the set of pairwise stable (ps) and pairwise strongly stable (pss) networks for = 0 and for = 0:03. Table 3 Set of ps networks Set of pss networks = 0 f3; 2g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f3; 2g = 0:03 f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g It fails to exist When = 0, any two …rms have an incentive to form a market-sharing agreement, as 
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Universidad ORT Uruguay By applying the strong-stability condition, we obtain that, when = 0, only the network whose components have size 3 and 2 is strongly stable.
Let us note, from Table 1 , that the strong criterion selects a subset of stable networks, which allows us to improve our prediction about which networks prevail over time. Now, let us observe that, for = 0:03, m (g l ) = 2 > m = 1. In spite of this fact, it is easy to see that the network f3; 1; 1g entails more competition than f3; 2g.
Additionally, this example illustrates that, in some circumstances, the strongly stable network fails to exist and that every network is defeated by some other network, which only leads to a cycling of these events.
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